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Abstract. We develop the proof theory of Hoare’s logic for the partial correctness of while- 
programs applied to arithmetic as it is defined by Peano’s axioms. By representing the strongest 
postcondition calculus in Peano arithmetic PA, we are able to show that Hoare’s logic over PA 
is equivalent to PA itself. 
Introduction 
Honre’s logic is a formal system for the manipulation of statements about the 
partial correctness of while-programs; it was first described in Hoare [ 131 and 
studied in Cook [lo]. The logic is a two-tiered axiomatic system for in addition to 
the axiorls and proof rules for asserted programs there is an independent formal 
specification for the data types on which the programs are applied. The purpose 
of the specification is to generate the assertions about the data types necessary to 
govern the Rule of Consequence. Hoare’s logic for the set %G?-’ of all while-programs 
with first-order assertion language t and first-order specification T we denote 
HL( 7-j. 
In this paper we consider the verification of programs computing on arithmetic 
iV without the privilege that Iv is a structure given outright, and with the restriction 
that it mast be axiomatically defined. Thus, whatever facts about arithmetic one 
needs in z, progrrim correctness proof must be formally deduced from a specification 
and not ‘popped’ from the oracll: ThUV), the first-order theory on IV. We wish to 
study verification in Hoare’s Iogx on an entirely proof-theoretic basis, founding 
proofs on what can be deriwd about arithmetic from what can be stated ahotct N 
irr n spkfkatim. 
Peads arithmetic PA is ‘in ideal axiomatisation for this purpose. Seen from the 
point of view of a data type specification, one arrives at PA by first axiomatising 
the primitive operations of arithpetic in an algebraic way - indeed, the initial 
algebra semantics of these axioms’picks out N as their unique meaning. And, 
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secondly, by augmenting the specification with the induction scheme. The latter 
refinement means one can use any assertion about N which stems from its primitive 
operations and can be proved by induction. Viewed from the proof theory of 
Hoare’s logic, the choice of PA combines conceptual simplicity and technical 
strength: although Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem tells that some valid assertions 
sbout N will not be provable from PA the fact is that meaningful assertions are 
decidedly difficult to find (see Paris and Harrington [ 181). 
The question we ask is simple enough: How much of the semantical machinery 
which underlies partial correctness can be faithfully represented in the proof theoretical 
machinery of PA and HL(PA)? We prove the following theorem in which we say 
that a specification T’ refines a specification T if T I- p implies T’ I--- p for any 
assertion p E L. 
Theorem. Given an assertion p E L and program S E WC? one can effectively calculate 
un assertion SP( p, S 1 E L such that 
( 1) SP( p, S) defines the strongest postcondition of S relative to p on the set of states 
over N; 
(2) HWW t-- {p)S(SP(p, S)}. 
And, for any refinement Tof Peano arithmetic, including PA itself, 
(3) HL(7 ) r {p}S{q) if and only if, T t- SP(p, S)-,CJ. 
Strictly speaking, statement (1) is not of proof-theoretical interest: stat mments 
(2 I and (3) establish the significance of the formula. Peano arithmetic provides a 
useful proof theory for partial correctness and (3) says that PA and HL(PA) are. 
in a very strong sense, equivalent systems. The corresponding theorem about 
weakest preconditions may also be proved, and the formalised pre- and postcondi- 
tion calculus introduced can be used to deduce other pleasant results about HL(PA). 
A simple example of interest to us is the following stability theorem about 
refinements of Peano arithmetic. 
Let R be a family of refinements of a data type specification T. Define the core 
of R b); 
CORE(R) = { y E L: 7” --- ~j for each T’ E R}. 
Cieariy, T = CORE(R 1. 
The stability of refinement families is one of a number of questions which arise 
in the thcorctical study of verification systems [14] especially those supporting data d 
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abstractions [16,17], where one is interested in the ways program correctness 
proofs depend upon specifications. Finite families of refinements are always stable, 
but stability remains a local property in general [8]. We shall prove this corollary 
here, since it is almost an immediate consequence of the theorem. Another 
application of the theorem appears in [9] where we prove a new kind of general 
completeness theorem for Hoare’s logic, one which holds for arbitrary specifi- 
cations rsther than those which are semantically stimplete in the sense of 
Cook [lo]. 
Sections 1 and 2 cover specifications and Hoare’s logic. In Sections 3 and 4 we 
prove the theorem and its corollary. An acquaintance with Hoare [13] and Cook 
[lo] is presumed, and the survey paper Apt [l] is recommended. Some experience 
with proving formal theorems in a first-order logical theory is essential for the 
reader who wants to properly understand the vital calculations inside Peano arith- 
metic (these are confined to Section 3). Another relevant reference for the article 
is Zucker [20] where a careful proof of the expressiveness of L for recursive 
procedures on N can be found. An obvious problem is to turn Zucker’s theorems 
about definability into proof-theoretical facts which generalise the main theorem 
here. 
This paper belongs to a series of articles about Hoare’s logic and specifications: 
various incompleteness and completeness properties of the logic are re-examined 
in [S, 7,9]; algebraic specifications are studied in [6]; families of refinements are 
the subject of [8]. All these articles derive from* [4], written with J. Tiuryn, and 
contain results pertinent to arithmetic computations, but none are prerequisite to 
understanding the mathematical contents of this paper. 
Finally, we thank W. Hodges for useful information on the literature on Peano 
arithmetic. 
1. Assertions, specifications and programs 
S>VU~X. First we summarise the syntactic ingredients of Hoare’s logic. 
The first-order language L = L(C) of some signature C is based upon a set of 
variables x 1, s2, . . . and its constant, function and relational symbols are those of 
L together with the boolean constants true, false and the equality relation. We 
assume L possesses the usual logical connectives and quantifiers; and the set of all 
algebraic expressions of L we denote T(C). 
If T is a set of assertions of L then the set of all formal theorems of T is denoteti 
Thm( T ): we write T t- p for p E Thm( T). Such a set T of formulae is usually called 
a theory, but in the present context we obviously prefer the more suggestive term 
specification. Here L serves as both an assertion/program specification language 
and a data type specification language. 
A specification T' is a rufinement of a specification T if Thm( T) c Thm(T’). And 
two specifications T, T' are (logically) cquiualent if Thm( T) = Thm(T’). If T is a 
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specification and R = { Ti : i E I} is a family of refinements of 7‘ then the cure of R is 
CORE(R) =n Thm(Ti). 
icl 
Using the syntax of L, the set -WY = LWg(E) of al 1 while-programs over C is 
defined in the customary way. 
E3y a specified or asserted program we mean a triple 
$z_Tit9 andp,qEL. 
of the form {p)S{q) where 
Semantics. Although semantics has no genuine r6le to play in this paper, some 
description of the meanings of the various components must be included because 
of statement (1) in the theorem, and in order to appreciate the use of Peano 
arithmetic as a data type specification. 
For any structure A of signatL re C, the semantics of the first-order language L 
over C as determined by A has its standard definition in model theory and this we 
assume to be understood. The validity of p E L ovu structure A we write A k p. 
The class of all models of a specification T is denoted Mod(T); we write Mod(T) != p 
ta mean that for every A E Mod(T), A I= p. G(idel’s Completeness Theorem says 
this about specifications: 
T t- p if, and only if, Mod(T) I=: p. 
As far as the proof theory ~)f a data type axioma.tisation T is concerned, the 
semantics of the specification is ModiTL Before looking at Peano arithmetic and 
the special problems at hand, consider the algebraic specification methods for data 
types where one invariably has a particzdor semantic model in mind for a 
specification. Following ADJ [l I], it is usual to settle on the initial model I(T) of 
Modi T) as the unique meaning for an nlgcbraic axiomatisation T. rhe logic of T 
is oblivious of :his (or any other) particular choice because it yields only those facts 
true in czll models of 7’. Refinements are a natural accessory of algebraic 
specifications: one starts with a simple algebraic specification (C, TJ to establish 
the correctness of the desired data type semantic5 A and then adds to T various 
assertions true in A as the need arises in program correctness proofs (say). But 
rcfintments are an essential accessory of algebraic specifications for although the 
algebraic methods can define virtually any data type one wants, the kinds of assertion 
provable from algebraic formulae are rather restricted (see [S] for a thorough 
discussion of this pi*oblem). 
So consider Peano arithmetic in the light of these remarks. The desired data 
type semantics is the standard model of arithmetic ?J. The domain of N is the set 
(1) of natural numbers and its primitive operations are the sucwssor firm&w s + 1, 
dditiw .x + 1’ and mrrltiplicc~tio~~ .v * v ; _ 0 E: OJ is a distinguished element. We shall 
IN thcsc notations for the functions md the function svmhols of its signature. 
Pcc~ncb arithmttic PA is built up as follows: 
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(1) O#x+l, 
ia x+l=y+l+x=y, 
i3 x+0=x, 
(4) x+(y+l)=(x+yj+l, 
(5) x l o=o, 
(6) x*(y+lj=x l y+x. 
Induction scheme : for each assertion p E L, containing free variable X, the foilow- 
ingisanaxiom[p(O)AVx l (p(x)+p(x+l))]+Vx *p(x), 
Thus, we may observe that equations (3)-(6) alone define N under initial algebra 
semantics and so we may consider (1) and (2) as additions, making a first refinement 
of the standard algebraic specification for arithmetic, designed to rule out finite 
models. The theoretical objective of adding the induction scheme is self-evident 
and was alluded to in our introduction: one wants to generate all assertions which 
make statements about N which can be based on its simple arithmetical operators 
and which can be proued by the principle of induction. For example, one can obtain 
facts about the ordering x s y of natural numbers by using the formula 3z 0 x + z = y. 
For the semantics of -WP as determined by a structure A, we leave the reader 
free to choose any sensible account of while-program computations which applies 
to an arbitrary structure: Cook [lo];. the graph-& -oretic semantics in Greibach 
[12]; the denotational semantics described in de Bakker [2]. To the asserted 
programs we assign partial correctrwss semantics: the asserted program (p}S{q} is 
r~nlid OIZ a structure A (in symbols: A l= {p}S{q}) if for each initial state a E States(A ), 
A tp!a) implies either S(a) terminates and A l=q(S(a)) or S(a J diverges. And 
the asserted program {p}S{q} is t:alid for a specification T if it is valid on eoerr 
model of T; in symbols, T /= {p}S{q} or Mod(T) I= {p}S{q}. 
The partial correctness theory of a structure A is the set 
PC(A) = WS{41: A p {PM?k 
and the partial correctness theory of a specification T is the set 
PC(T) = {(p}S{cl): Mod(T) t= {p}S{4)J- 
Clearly, 
Finally, we define strongest postconditious. Let p E L and S E WP, both having 
tz variables. The stror-zgmt postcondition of S and p on a structure A is the :;et 
~~.~(~,S)={~EA”:~~EA” *[Sk ) terminates in final state h and A t= p(a )I). 
1.1. Lemma. A =={p}S{q} espA(p, S)c{b EA’? A bq(b)). 
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HoarCs logic for -W’P = WY(E) with assertion language L = L(C) and 
specification T c L, has the following axioms and proof rules for manipulating 
ast;ersed programs: let S, &, S+ -WP; p, q, pl,ql, r EL; b EL, a quantifier-free 
farm&k 
W Assignmetir axiom scheme: for e E TIC) and x a variable of L, the asserted 
program 
is ;an ~iom, Mere p[e/x] stands for the result of substituting e for free occurrences 
of x in p* 
i 2 ) C’OmpDsif&n rule : 
{PWSlk& {P A --w2k7~ 
S1 else S2 fi {q}’ 
(4) hation de : 
(p} while h do S od {p * -oh 1’ 
AL&, in Connec’Cion with (5 i, 
1 t6t Speci/?cn~i~rz nxiont : Each member of T’hm(T) is an axiom. 
The set nf aswtsd programs derivable from these axioms bv the proof rules we 
&ote HI-Q) ~?nd we write HINX- {p)S(q) in place of (p]S&+ HLO?. 
-3 
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The corollary to Theorem 1 in Cook [lo] says this: 
2.3. Soundness Theorem. For any specification T, HL( T) c PC(T). 
3. Proof of the Theorem: The strongest postcondition and Peans arithmetic 
This section is devoted to making the formal first-order strongest postcondition 
SP( p, S) for a given assertion p and program S, and to proving some of its 
fundamental properties as a formula in Peano arithmetic. These fundamental 
properties are the Implication Law 3.4, the Existential Law 3.5, and the Conjunction 
Law 3.6, and they are of proof-theoretical interest in their own right because they 
shape a formal calculus for the strongest postcondition within PA. Here they are 
needed to prove two theorems about invariant assertions for the while-construct: 
using Invariant Laws 3.7 and 3.8, the proofs of statements (2) and (3) of our 
theorem can be given as quite direct calculations in Section 4. However this section 
requires quite some time to digest. The reader may care to obtain an overview of 
the results of the section and then go on to consider the way the strongest 
postcondition calculus is used in Hoare’s logic (Section 4). What makes difficulties 
in a proof of this theorem - and in a proof of a generalisation to more complicated 
program languages - is the extremely sharp picture of the logic& structure of the 
strongest postcondition formulae one must have, if one is to get anything proved 
about them in PA. (The well-structured and mechanical appearance of formal 
proofs in PA should always be considered a criterion for the success of a logical 
analysis which PA is asked to support.) 
We shall divide the work of this section between 3 unnumbered subsections. 
The definition of SP(p, S). The formal strongest postcondition will be inductively 
defined over the structure of the program, and it will be obvious that SP(p, S) can 
be effectively calculated from p and S. The fact that SP(p, S) does indeed define 
the strongest postcondition spN(p, S) on the standard model of arithmetic N will 
be a straightforward exercise whose interest or tediousness depends on the reader’s 
chosen semantics for -%V%? Because of the design of SP(p, S), statement (1) of our 
theorem will be trivia1 to verify for any sensible operational semantics for -%‘I? 
We construct the formula SP(p, S) in a simple extension L, of the first-order 
language L of PA. This language L, merely contains formal names for encoding 
formulae which will be used in connection with the while-construct, and so rep- 
resents a notational convenience. However, it is a notational convenience which 
must be justified, for its introduction immediately places tis outside Peano arith- 
metic. To step back, we must also axiomatise the new function symbols in an 
extension PA, of PA and observe that the theory PA, based upon L, is a so-called 
chzirzable extension of PA based upon L (Theorem 3.1 j. Here is the construction 
of L, and PA,. 
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First add to It a binary function symbol C, to stand for a coding or pairing 
Opel-ation, together with unary function symbols L, R to stand for its left and right 
unpairing operations as expressed by the axiom 
(1) C(L(x), R(x)) =x- 
Next, we add to L two binary function symbols REDUCE and PROJECT to stand 
for special decomposition operations satisfying the expressions 
REDUCE(n, y) = R”(y) and PROJECT(n, y) =LR”(y). 
These decompositions are formally axiomatised by the First-order formulae 
(2) REI>UCE(O, y ) = y, 
(3) REDUCE(x + 1, y ) = R (REDUCE& y I), 
(4) PROJECT(x, y) = L(REDUCE(x, 4’)). 
Thirdly, we add a ternary symbol INSERT to stand for an operation which 
introduces new codes into old ones. It ifi formally axiomatised by 
r51 INSERT& 0, z ) = C(X, R (z )), 
(6, INSERT(x, )’ + 1, z) = C(L(x), INSERT& ;. , .!? (2)). 
Fina!ly we !soot the coding operation inside PA with the axiom 
which i:, taken fror-z the well-known bijection code: W’ -+ (t) defined by 
The proof of a theorem such as Theorem 3.1 is an involved affair, one which 
t nrcwrdingly copies the biucprint of Section 73 of Kleene [ 151 :sec also Smorynski 
; l9]). We omit the argument. Theorem 3.1 authorises us to USC-’ I_, to define our 
fc rmulac SP( pq 9, and prove formal properties about 141ern using PA,., while 
&splaying I_ XX! PA in the stiltements of our theorems. ‘For example, here is a 
Ic*rnrn:t shout mdings in Pt’mo which WC will ntxd Iatcr on. First, WC introduce 
4t)mc inqwrtant nofaficms. 
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ROWk(i, Z) = (PROJ(0, PROJ(i, z)), . . . , PROJ(k -2, PROJ(i, z )), 
RED(k - 1, PROJ(i, 2))). 
For X a list of variables x 1, . . . , xk we write 
Wk = an, ax2,. l ’ 9 an-19 x/c) l ’ l H* 
3.2. Lemma. It is the case that 
(i) PAt-j<i&= INS(u,i+l,z)+(X=RGW&‘,z)++X=ROW,(j,z’)), 
(ii) PAt-z’=INS((X)~,i+l,z)+X=ROW~(i+l,z’), 
(iii) PAt-X=ROWk(i+l,z’)+3z ~(z’=INS((X)~,i+l,z)). 
Thus the formal theorems (i)-(iii) are actually written in L, and proved using 
PA,, but the elimination theorem maps each statement to an official statement in 
L provable from PA. The proof of Lemma 3.2 is left as an exercise for the reader. 
We can now define SP(p, S), using this coding machinery to represent in L an 
operational account of its role on N. 
Assume assertion p EL and program S E -%9 are given. Let X denote the list 
of k program variables of S and let Y denote the list of those free variables of p 
not already contained in X. This Tnotation for the lists of variables in as.;ertiorz p and 
program S we use without further declaration throughout the paper. The formula 
SP(p, S) will have X and Y as its list of free variables and is inductively defined 
as follows: 
w p, -I- := C)Z~V . [s = e[)?/_r] ~p[y/x]] _ where )’ is not a free 
variable of p, 
wp, s1; S2) = wwp, w, S2), 
Wp, if b then S1 else Sz fi) = SP( p A 6, Sl) v SP( p A 3, Sz), 
SP( p, while b do So od) = INV( p, 6, So) A lb 
where INV(p, b, So) is the formula built up as follows. 
First, set 
A& z, Y)~~[ROW~(O,~)/X]A~~<~*SP(X=ROW~(~,Z)A~,&) 
[ROW,& + 1, z,lX] 
and then define 
B,(i, z,X, Y)=A,,(i, Z, Yj AX = ROW,&, z). 
Next set 
INV*( p, b, So)(i, X, Y) = 32 l Ni, z, X, YJ 
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and so define 
INV(p, 6, S&X, Y) =3i - INV*(p, 6, S&i, X, Y). 
The strongest postcondition calculus. We give three formal theorems about the 
strongest postcondition formula. 
3.4. Implication Law. Let p, q be assertions and S a program. Let Z be a list of 
variables containing the list X of the k program variables of S. Then 
and consequently 
PApvZ!p c-) q)-+trZ6P(p, S) f, SP(q, S)). 
Proof. The argument is by induction on the structure of S for which the basis is 
the assignment. 
Assignment: S :: = x := Y. Clearly 
because x occurs in X c Z. Therefore, 
of course. 
The induction step divides into 3 cases. 
c%rilpcm-trrl : S : : = S,: S?. By the induction hypothesis applied to S1 we know 
that 
PA - E?p -+q‘)--+Z(SP~p, S++SP(4, S2)j 
because Z contains xhc \rariables of S,. By the induction hypothesis applied to .$ 
we know that 
PA r- VZSP( p, S,) -j SP(q, S,,) 
-+ VZ(SP(SP( p, s, L S*)-+ SP(SP(q, S*), S,O. 
?‘hua,. hy the definition of SP( p, S I and SP(q, S 1, 
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Conditional: S :: = if 6 then S1 else Sz fi. Clearly, 
PAtVZ(p+q)+VZ(p ~6+9 ~6), 
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, 
P&-tlZ(p~6-+9~6 ) + Vz(sP(p A 6, sl) + sP(9 A 6, &), 
PA~-V~(~A~~-,~A~~)~V~(SP(~A~~,S~)-,SP(~A~~,S~)) 
because 2 contains the variables of S1 and &. When it follows that 
PAI-VZ(p+q) 
+Vz(SP(p A 6, &) v SP(p A -+, &) + SP(9 A 6, &) v SP(9 A 16, s$)) 
which is the theorem we require, by the definition of SP( p, S) and SP(9, S ,. 
Iteration : S : : = while 6 do So od. Because X c 2, we know that 
PAtVZ(p +9)+VZ(p[ROW,&. 2)/X]+9[ROWk(i, r)/X]). 
Conjoining formulae to make up A&, z, Y) and A,&, 2,. I’) w deduce 
PAt-VZ(p-,q)~VZ(A,(i,z, Y)+A,(z’,z, Yj). 
Conjoining X = ROW&‘, z) and then 3i,3z we proceed to 
PAt_VZ(p-+9)+VZ(B,(i, z,X, Y)-*B,,(i, 2,X, Yj), 
PA t- VZ( p + 9) + VZ(INV( p, 6, So) -+ INV(9,6, S&. 
Finally, conjoining -16 it follows that 
Notice we did not use the induction hypothesis in this case. q 
3.5. Existential Law. Let p he an assertion arzd S a program. Let z be n uariaide 
dukh is uot olte in the list X of the program variables of S, Then 
PA t- SP(3z . p, S) - 3z l SP(p, S). 
Proof. The argument is by induction on the structure of S for which the basis is 
the assignment. 
Assign mm t : S :: = .Y := c. By definition, 
PA t- SP(3z l p, s := 4) - 34 (32 l p[zi/x] A x = e[u/x]), 
PA t- 3u (32 l p[u/x] A x = e[u/x]) - 3z l 3u ~JI[U/S] A x = [u/x]), 
PA--SP(3z l p,x :=e)-3z l SP(p,x :=e). 
The induction step divides into 3 cases. 
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~Cimposition : S : : = S1 ; S2. By definitk I, 
PA t- SP(3z l p, S1; S2) c-, SP(SP(3z ’ p, S,), Sz). 
By the induction hypothesis bppiied to S1 and the last statement of the Implication 
Law 3.4, 
PA I-- SP(SP(3z l p, S1), Sz) - SP(3z . SP( p, S1), &) 
and analogously with the induction hypothesis applied to S2, 
PA t SP(3z l SP(y, Sl), Sz) - 32 l SP(SP(p, St), sz). 
Combining these theorems we conclude from the definition of SP( p, S), 
PA t- SP(3z - p, S1; &) - 3z . SP( p, SI ; Sz). 
Corzditiorznl: S : : = if b then S1 else Sz fi. By definition, 
PA t- SP(3r 9 p, S) - SP(3z * p, S1) v SP(3z o p, S2). 
By the induction hypothesis, 
PA t SP(3z 9 p, S,) v SP(3r . p, S2) 
Thus, pulling out the existential quantifier and using the definition of SP( p, Sj we 
derive 
PA L- 
Iltv-aticrt : s 
PA;- 
Inspecting the 
SPi3z * p. S) - 32 l SP( p, SJ. 
:: = while Fr do So od. By definition, 
SP(3z l p, S, 
+-+3i a 32’&, . & z’, Y) AX = ROW&, 2’)) A --+. 
definition of Agz . pi, z’, Y) one sees that 
PA c- 3i * 3:’ . Aq_ ,(i, z’, I”) c-, 3i 9 32’ l 3z 9 A&, z’, YJ. 
Whence the result follows since existential quantifiers commute: 
PA+ SPt32 .p.S) 
- 3z(3i - 32’(A&, z’, 1’) AX = ROW&, ~‘11 A-dd, 
PAwSP(3s .p,S,++3z .SP(p,S). 
Notice we did not use the induction hypothesis in this case. G 
3.6. Conjunction Law. I et p, q be aswrtions arid S a rvograrrz. Let the free zuriabks 
of q md the program cariahks of S he disjoint lists. Thtw 
PA .- SPt p A q, s 1 - q A SP( p, s j. 
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The proof of this fact closely resembles the Existential Law 3.5 and is omitted. 
The invariant laws. We conclude our work with Peano arithmetic with two impor- 
tant laws about the invariants used in the inductive definition of the strongest 
postcondition in the iteration case. These laws are basic lemmas for the arguments 
in the next section. 
3.7. Invariant Law. Let p be an assertion and let S be a program Then 
(i) PA t- p + INV(p, 6, S), 
(ii) PA I- SP(INV(p, 6, S) A 6, S) + INV( p, 6, S). 
3.8. Invariant Law. Let p be an assertion and let S be a program. Then 
(i) PA t- INV*( p, 6, S)(O) + p, 
(ii) PA I- INV*( p, b, S)(i + 1) c-) SP(INV*( p, b, S)(i) A 6, S). 
Now Invariant Law 3.8 is quite some work, but Invariant Law 3.7 is a short 
calculation once Law 3.8 is proven and so we give this proof first. 
Proof of Invariant Law 3.7. Consider case (i). Clearly, 
PA + p + B,(O, INSI(X)~, 0, z 1, X, Yi, 
PA t- B,,(O, INS((X)k, 0, z), X. Y)+INV*(p, 6, S)(O, X: Yl, 
PA t- INV*(p, 6, S)(O, X, Y I- INWp, 6, S). 
And we are done. 
Consider case (ii). 
PA t- SP(INV(p, 6, S) A b, S)+ SP(3i . INV*(p, 6, S)(i j A 6, S). 
By the Existential Law 3.5, 
P,4 t- SP(3i l INV*(p, 6, S)(i) r\ 6, S) 
+ 3i 0 SP(INV*( p, 6, S)r i) A b, S j. 
By Invariant Law 3.8, 
b 
PA t- 3i 9 SP(INV*(p, b, S)(i) A b, S)+ 3i l INV*(p, 6, S)(i + I). 
Trivially, 
PA I- 3i l INV*( p, b, S)(i + 1) + INV( p, h, S). 
And we are done. El 
Proof of Invariant Law 3.8. Case (i) is obvious so consider case (ii). 
First of all we will need two formal theorems which we record here and prove 
at the end of the section. 
278 J.A. Bergstra, if. Tucker 
3.9. Lemma. Let p be an assertion and S a program. Thtw 
(i) PA t- A,(i, z, Y) -Ati, INS@, i + 1, z), Y), 
(ii) PA t A,(i, z, Y) 
A SP(X = ROWk (i, Z) A 6, S)[X/ROW (i + 1, z >I +-+ A,,(i + 1,~ y)* 
Here is the deduction for case (ii) of Invariant Law 3.8. By the definition of 
INV*(p, 6, S)(i), 
PA t SP(INV”(p, 6, S)(i) A 6, S) - SP(3z - B,(i, z, X, Y) 4 b, S). 
By the Existential Law 3.5 and the definition of I?,(& z, X, YJ, and the Conjunction 
Law 3.6, 
PA t- SP(3z - B,(i, z, X, Y) A 6, S) 
- 3z * [A,,(( z, Y) A SP(X = ROWk (i, z ) A h, s)]. 
So cons!der this last formula through several transformations: it is equivalent in 
PA to 
3z - 3z’[? = INS((X)k, i + 1, z) A A,,(i, 2, Y) 
A SP(X = ROW&, z) nh, S)]. 
By Lemma 3.9(ij, it is equivalent to 
32 . 32’[=’ = INS((X)k, i + 1, z 1 A A,,(i, z’, Y) 
A sP(x = ROW, ti, 2) A h, s)]. 
By Lemma 3.2(ii), it is equivalent to 
32 - 32 ‘iz ’ = INS((X)k, i + 1, z ) A A&, 2 ‘. 1’ 1 
,I SP(.Y = ROW&, 2) A/I, S) AX = ROW& + 1, ,-‘)I. 
Applying the Implication Law q .4 to Lemma 3.2(i), it is equivalent to 
3~ a 3z’[,-’ = INS((X)k, i + 1, 2) r\ A,,ii, z’, Y) 
:Y SP(X = RC Wk (i, 2 ‘) A /I, S) A .X = ROWI, (i + 1, c 71. 
And. clearly, this last i&rmula is equivalent in PA to 
,y SP(X = ROW,, ti, z ‘) A h, S)[ROWk (i + 1, z ‘j/X]]. ( :g 1 
?i:ow by Lemma 3.24i) and the definition of AI,, this formula implies 
u hich is equivalent to 
35 - R,,C+ l,z’,X, I’, 
Hoare ‘s logic and Peano ‘s arithmetic 
which is equivalent o 
INV*(p, 6, S)(i + 1). 
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On the other hand to prove the reverse implication, that (**) implies (*) in PA, 
one can rely on Lemma 3.2(iii). 
This concludes the proof of Invariant Law 3.8, given Lemma 3.9. CI 
Proof of Lemma 3.9. Consider (i). By definition, A#, z, Y) is equivalent in PA to 
p[ROWk(O,z)/X]/\Vt<i .SP(X=ROW~(~,Z)A~,S)CROW~(~-~~, z,/X]. 
Now by Lemma 3.2(i), the first conjunct can be replaced by 
p[ROWk (0, INS@, i -I- 1, z))/X]. 
By Implication Law 3.4, applied to Lemma 3.2(i), the second conjunct can be 
replaced by 
Vt <i l SP(X = ROW&, INS& i + 1, z)) A b, S)[ROW& + 1, z ,lX]. 
Using Lemma 3.2(i) again, this formula is equivalent to 
Vt < i - SP(X = ROW&, INS(u, i + 1, z) A b, S) 
[ROWk (t + 1, INS& i + 1, z ),/Xl . 
and SO the conjunction is what we require: by definition, 
PA t- A,&, z, I”) - A,(i, IN&d, i + 1, z ), YI- 
Next consider (ii). By definition, A,( i + 1, z, Y j is equivalent in PA to 
p[ROWk (0,=)/X] A Vt =C i + 1 . SP(X = ROW&, z ) n 6, S)[ROW& + 1, 2)/X]. 
The second conjunct can be rewritten as 
Vt ri . SP(X = ROW& z) A 6, S)[ROW& + 1, z,/X] 
r\SP(X = ROW&, z 1 A 6, S)[ROW& + 1, z,lX]. 
And so regrouping the formula we immediately get 
PA t- A,&’ + 1, z, I’) 
- A,,6 z, Y) A SP(X = ROW,&, z) A b, S)[ROW&‘+ 1, z,/X]. 
This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.9 and so the proof of the Invariant Laws 
3.8 and 3.7. 5 
4. Proof of the Theorem: The strongest postcondition and Hoare’s logic 
It now remains for us to consider the role of a formal first-order stlongest 
postcondition SP(p, S) in Hoare’s logic HL(PA) based on Peano arithmetic PA. 
280 J.A. Bergstra, J. V. Tucker 
The proofs of statements (2) and (3) of the theorem use induction on the structure 
of a program and are fairly smooth arguments because of the Invariant Laws which 
organise the calculations involving the while-constri: -%. 
Statement 2. For arty p E L and S E WV 
HL(PA) t- {p}S{W p, 9). 
Proof. The argument is an induction on S for which the basis is the assignment 
statement. 
Assignment : S = x := e. First observe the following trivial theorems of Peano 
arithmetic: 
PA+p-+(e =e[x/x]~p[x/x]) 
PA I- (4 = dxlxl A p[-u/x])-+ ‘3~ 1 (X = e[y/x] 6 p[j$~]) 
PA t- 3L’ l IX = 4Nxl A &Yx])-+ 3s’ l (x = e[y/x] A p[y/x])[e/x]. 
Ry the definition of the formal strongest postcondition we conclude that 
PA i-p +SP(p, x := e)[e/x]. 
The axiom scheme for assignment provides 
HL(PA) t- (SP( p, x := e )[e/x])x := c{SP( p, x := e)) 
HL(PA) I- {SP(p, x := c)[e/x]}x := e{SP(p, x := (7)) 
and by the Rule of Consequence it follows that HL(PA) I- (p)S(SP(p, S)}. 
The induction step divides into 3 cases: 
Composition : S = S1 ; Sz. The induction hypothesis applied to S1 and SZ yields 
that for any p E L 
HWA) b- (p}S~(sP(p, S,)}. 
HL(PA) t- {SP(p, S1 I)S~(SP(SP(p, Sl), S;I)} 
anti the Composition Rule combines these Formal theorems to dcrivt: 
HLiPA, + (p}&; S,(SP(SP(p, $1, Sz)) 
which is HL( PA) P- { p}S{SP(p, S)} by its definition. 
CWUWOULI~: S = if b then SI else S2 fi. The induction hypothek appkd to SI 
arfd Sz yields that for any p E L 
HL(PA)~-- (p A (cI)SJSP(p A b, SJ), 
Hl.c PA) i--- (p A --:h}S2{SPr p A -+, S,,). 
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From the derived rule Disjunction Lemma 2.2 and the Rule of Consequence it 
follows that 
HL(PA) t- {p A b}Sr{SP(p, 6, Sl) v SP(p A lb, Sz)}, 
HL(PA) t- {p A lb}&{SP(p A 6, &) v SP(p A 16, S& 
The Conditional Rule combines these formal theorems to derive 
HL(PA) t- {p} if b then S1 
else & fi {SP(p A 6, S1) ‘I/ SP@ A 16, SZ)} 
which is HL(PA) t- { p}S{SP( p, S)} by its definition. 
Iteration : S = while 6 do SO od. The induction hypothesis applied to So yields 
for any p E L 
HLtW t- {INUp, b, So’) A b}So{SP(INC(p, b, So) A 6, So,}. 
From Invariant Law 3.7(ii) and the Rule of Consequence it follows that 
HL(PA) t- {INV( p, 6, So) I\ b}So{INV(p, b, So)) 
and, using the Iteration Rule, that 
HL(PA) t- {INV(p, 6, So)} while b do So od {INWp, b, .!!,J A -6). 
Applying the Rule of Consequence with Invariant Law 3.7(i), and using the 
definition of the strongett post-condition, we conclude 
HL(PA) I- {p)S{SRp, S)}. 
This concludes the proof of the statement. E 
Statement 3. Fbr any p, q E L and S E WY’, and jbr arly extension T of Pearzo 
arithmetic, 
HL(T) t- { p)S{q} if, and only if, T I-- SP(p, S) + y. 
Proof. Assume T t- SP( p, S) +q. Because T extends Peano arithmetic, statement 
2 implies HL( TJ I- {p}S{SP(p, S)}; by the Rule of Consequence we derive 
HW”) I-- {p)S{ql. 
Ti? 3 argument for the other implication is more involved and is an induction on 
S for which the basis is the assignment statement: 
A sign men t : S =x := e. Suppose that HL(T) I- (p}~ := e(q). Then there must 
exist an assertion r E L such that 
T i--- p -+ r[e/x], 
HL(T) C- {r[e/x]}x := e(r), 
Tcr+q. 
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Now in T we can calculate 
T t- SP( p, x := e)+3y ’ (x = e [y/x] A p [y/x]) by definition, 
Tt-SP(p,x :=e)+3y l (x = ddxl A ~kbl~llxl) 
because fron T t- p -, r[e/x] it follows that T t- p[y/x] + r[e[y/x]/x]. Continuing: 
TtSP(p,x := e)+3y * (x = e [y/x] A r[xlx ], 
Tt-- SP(p,x := e)-* 3y . (x = e[y/x] r\ r), 
T+SP(p,x :=e)-+r becausey&FV(r), 
T t- SP( p, x := e ) + q. 
And this is what is required. 
The induction step divides into 3 C~XY 2 
Conrporitian : S = S1 ; S2. Suppose that HL( T) t- (p}S{q). Then there exists an 
assertion r E L such that 
HL(T) k {p}S,{r} and HL( T) t- {r}Sz{q}. 
Applying the induction hypothesis to S1 we find that T I- SP( p, S1 I -+ r and by the 
Rule of Consequence it follows that HL( T) I-- {SP(p, S1 )}&{cj}. ?‘ow applying the 
induction hypothesis to this last asserted program yields 
T -- SP(SP(p, S1), S,)-+q 
which is T -- SP( p, S) + q by the definition of the strongest po: _or,diticn. 
Cotzditiot~ul: S = if h then S1 else S2 fi. Suppose that HL( T) t- { p)S(q \. Then 
HLc T) L {p A h)&{q) and HL( T) I--- (p A 3 ~s&‘~~ 
Applying the induction hypothesis yields 
T-SP!~/I~,S+~ and Tt--SP(p r\-+,S:!)+~]. 
Thus, 
TV-SP(p ~h.&)vSP(p ~-l!~,S)-+q 
vlhich is T L- SP( p, S) -+(I by the definition of the strongest postcondition. 
Itt~mtiotz : S = while h do So od. Suppose that HL(T) t-- {p)S{q}. Then there must 
twist an assertion r E L such that 
HLc T ) - {r A b )&(r}, 
Appl! ing the induction hq, whesis to the asserted program above yields 
i*) 
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We shall derive the following theorem in T 
TtINV(p,b,S&+r 
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(**I 
when we simply calculate 
T t- WV{ p, 6, So) A lb) -) (r A lb j, 
T t- SP(p, S) + q 
by definition of the strongest postcondition and the fact that T t- I’ A lb +q. 
To prove (**j first recall that 
INV(p, 6, So) = 3 l INV*( p, b, S,,)(i) 
and so it is sufficient to prove 
T I- INV*(p, 6, S,,)(i) + r. 
This is done using the induction scheme in Peano arithmetic which is also available 
in T. 
Basis : T t- INV*( p, b, So)(O) + r. 
This follows from the Invariant Law 3.8(i) and T t- p + r. 
Induction step: If T I- INV*( p, 6, So)(i) -+ r then T I-- INV”(p, h, S&i + 1) 3 r. 
Consider Invariant Law 3.8(G): the theorem of T we require follows from 
T t- SP(INV*( p, 6, S&‘) A h, So) + r. 
‘This follows easily from an application of Implication Law 3.4 to 
T I-- INV*(p, 6, &J(i) A h + r A 6, 
T k- SP(INV*(p, 6, S,,)(i) A 6, So) + SP(r A h, s,) 
by Invariant Law 3.8, 
T t- SP(INV*(p, 6, S&i) A b, SO) + r by FL 
This concludes the proof of (**), Statement 3 and the theorem. 0 
Proof of Corollary. Let R be a family of refinements of ?A such that for each 
T E R we have HL( T) t- {p}S{q}. Then, by the theorem, Statement 3, we have 
T I-- SP(p, S) + q for each T E R and so, by definition, the formula SP(p, S) + q E 
CORE(R). Now PA is extended by CORE(R), thus HL(CORE(Rjj+{p)S{q) by 
Statement 3 of the theorem. 0 
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